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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAT ~I. JOHNSON FRENCH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
PHILLIP T. JOHNSON, 
Defclldant and Respondent. 
STATE1\1:EN·T OF FACTS 
No. 
10147 
I do not entirely agree with plaintiff's statement of 
the facts and Inake the following addition thereto. 
This action arose fron1 an order to show cause why 
the defendant should not be punished for contempt of 
ronrt for failure to pay child support in the sum of 
$50.00 per 1nonth, R-1-1, made by Judge David Lewis, 
1 
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Judge of the Third District Court, under a reciprocal 
agreement from the District Court of Bonneville County, 
Idaho, where the divorce was obtained. 
After hearing the evidence on the lOth of February, 
1964, the court entered its order finding there wasn't any 
contempt and denied the right of the plaintiff to recover 
the accrued sum of $5,300.00, as well as attorney's fees 
and costs (R. 23). 
The plaintiff then filed her motion for a new trial, 
and the same was heard on the evidence previously sub-
mitted on J\farch 9, 1964, and the court denied plaintiff's 
motion and made and entered its findings on the 7th day 
of April, 1964 (R. 52 to 56). 
The decree entering the $50.00 per month child sup-
port was made on the 18th day of March, 1954 (R. 14). 
The plaintiff was married to l\fr. French on March 10, 
1954, eight days before the decree was entered, (Tr. P. 
88) on March 12ttl the plaintiff and her new husband . 
left Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Connecticut, (Tr. P. 88) and 
that the husband petitioned the United States government 
for support money for the child. This mind you was in 
l\farch, 1954, and payments from 1\fr. Johnson commenced 
March 25, 1954, and these payments continued during 
1954 and part of 1955, and were received by the plaintiff, 
as well as the allotments received by plaintiff's husband 
for the support of the child, who has assumed his name 
(Tr. 91). 
2 
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rf'hP I'!'('O!'(l ShOWS that the Only effort by plaintiff 
to vontaet tlw defendant wa~ April 20, 1956, and that 
the plaintiff n'eeived a letter from A. L. Smith, the at-
tona'y who ~Peured the divorce decree in Idaho, on 
J nne 20, 1956, ( R. p. 26) advising plaintiff to get in per-
sonal contaet with the defendant, yet nothing was done 
by n'ason of that. However, on February 10, 195·5, Ed-
\\'ard M. PikP, Prosecuting Attorney of Bonneville Coun-
ty. Idaho. wrote the District Attorney of the Third Judi-
eial District saying, "Mrs. Johnson, is in dire circum-
stances." 
The prosecuting attorney was not informed by the 
plaintiff that she had married a member of the armed 
foret's of the United States by the name of French, and 
that all benefits and allotments due dependants under the 
Federal Act had been claimed by French as his own 
child, under the name of Vicki Lee French, who is now 
of the age of eleven and attends school under the name 
of French (Tr. 91). 
The record further shows that in 1961-five years 
after ~Ir. French's discharge from the Navy-that the 
plaintiff and her family were again in Idaho Falls and 
tht>y contacted the deputy prosecutor for Bonneville 
County, Idaho, regarding the support money (R. 30 to 
36). From that time nothing was done until the plaintiff 
wa8 contacted at her home in Idaho Falls by Horace J. 
Knowlton, an attorney of Salt Lake City, who instituted 
this action on an original order to show cause on Febru-
ary 10, 1964, before the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, 
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a judge of the Third District Court for Salt Lake County. 
This covers the activities of the plaintiff over the past 
ten years. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT WAS SOUNDLY BASED 
ON THE EVIDENCE WHICH JUSTIFIED A FINDINGS OF 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND LACHES, AS WELL AS A 
MATERIAL CHANGE IN CONDITIONS. 
There is no representation here that the child has 
not been the beneficiary of equivalent support and 
education. She received allotments for the entire period 
of Mr. French's service in the Navy and in addition 
the mother received the payments from the defendant 
until the clerk of the court could not further relay the 
payments, due to the notation, "moved, no forwarding 
address," (Tr. 83 and 85) and the plaintiff utterly failed 
to ascertain the defendant's address for a period of nine 
years, though she knew the company which employed him 
when the marriage was executed (Tr. 79). 
In the Larsen vs. Larsen case, 5 Utah 2nd, 224 - 300 
Pac. 2 - 596, this court said, P. 228- (3) : 
"It is the prerogative of the trial court to de-
termine these facts and if he finds that facts exist 
to justify equitable estoppel, he should apply that 
doctrine and relieve the father from payment of 
the installments to the extent indicated. Of course, 
as to future payments, there is no question that 
she is entitled to collect from the time she made 
demand." 
4 
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This d(•l't>tulant has h<>Pn 1naking the payments from the 
date of the order (R. ~3). 
Thi~ ease is stronger by far than the Larsen Case, 
supra, nml justly warrants the findings of the trial court 
on laehes also. 
The other cases cited by counsel for the appellant 
are not in point and should not be given the time of 
consideration. 
POINT 2. 
THIS APPEAL IS BASED UPON THE COURT'S DENIAL 
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The trial court, having heard all of the evidence 
in the Order to Show Cause hearing, saw the demeanor 
and action of the witnesses, and denied plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial and made its findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and judgment (R. 52 to 56). 
\Yhere in the law is justification for the filing of a 
motion for a new trial after the denial of an order to 
show cause has been made~ 
A new trial would constitute a trial of all of the 
i~sues which were settled in the hearing of March 5, 1954, 
in Idaho Falls, Idaho. If the plaintiff was aggrieved 
by the court's refusal to grant her order to show cause, 
she should have appealed that order. 
5 
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The newly discovered evidence claimed in plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial is purely cumulative evidence 
which was testified to by the witnesses at the hearing of 
the motion for an order to show cause, and no valid rea-
son was given at this hearing as to why the actual letters 
were not introduced at the original hearing. 
There is also a material change in the status of the 
defendant. His health and earning power have lessened 
(T·r. 83) and he would not have permitted such a burden 
to accumulate, had it not been the failure of the plaintiff, 
over a period of years, to contact him. 
CONCLUSION 
I submit that the lower court should be affirmed in 
its actions and orders in its entirety. 
Respectfully submitted, 
6 
W. R. HUNTSMAN, 
8505 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, Utah 
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